What's Wrong with Dodd-Frank 1502?

I have a new working paper up at the Center for Global Development. It's entitled, "What's Wrong with Dodd-Frank 1502? Conflict Minerals, Civilian Livelihoods, and the Unintended Consequences of Western Advocacy." You can read the paper here.

The central argument of the paper is that Dodd-Frank 1502, while based in well-intentioned efforts to improve the situation in the Congo, has caused more problems that it has solved, and is unlikely to improve the security situation in eastern Congo when the SEC rules are released and implemented. This is because there is no evidence that supply chain traceability mechanisms actually get fighters to stop fighting, particularly in a very weak state. Moreover, as we are already seeing, smuggling tends to increase and civilian miners are put out of work. In the paper, I delve into an analysis of why the advocacy community chose to focus on conflict minerals and why that focus was misguided. I also suggest steps for a way forward that would both help to improve transparency in the mineral trade while arguing that violence is a separate problem with a separate solution.

I welcome your comments and questions on the paper. Thanks to the folks at the Center for Global Development for publishing it. All errors are, of course, my own.

quick notes on the GoE report

The UN Group of Experts on the DRC released their 2011 final report today. It's available in English here and in French here. Here are the highlights (or, really, lowlights):

• The ADF-NALU is much more active after a period of dormancy. The GOE report contains detailed information about their activities, including an uptick in assassinations of those perceived to be FARDC collaborators. The ADF is financing its activities by taxing chainsaw use for the timber trade and is getting money from foreign jihadis. And they're recruiting in Burundi.
• The Lord's Resistance Army has largely decamped to the Central African Republic.
• The FDLR is beset with internal disputes over leadership. They've also expanded their revenue-generating activities to the cannabis trade.
• FDLR ex-combatants told the Group that the FDLR receives about 95% of its weapons via the FARDC, often in exchange for bush meat, minerals, or cannabis.
• While there has been some reduction in the conflict mineral trade, mineral smuggling from DRC to Rwanda has greatly increased over the past year, largely in response to the unintended consequences of Dodd-Frank Section 1502. See Jonny Hogg and Graham Holliday's excellent analysis here.
• The CNDP maintains its parallel command structures within the FARDC. They also maintain a parallel police force with PARECO in Masisi under the control of Bosco Ntaganda.
• The Group found clear evidence of Ntaganda having planned to force local populations to vote for his favored CNDP political candidates for office in the November elections.
• The de facto ban on Congolese mineral sales has had relatively little effect on the gold trade thus far as gold is easier to move outside of due diligence channels. This has caused many artisanal miners to switch from mining the 3T's to mining gold.
• Armed groups are still very much involved in the mineral trade in eastern DRC.

holiday greetings, texas-style

Merry Christmas, y'all!

DRC election results: quick reax

As expected, today's announcement of provisional election results by CENI (the Congo's independent national electoral commission) showed Joseph Kabila winning with 48% of the vote. Etienne Tshisekedi was the runner-up with 32% of the vote. Tshisekedi almost immediately rejected the results, declaring himself president from today forward. There are reports of celebrations in Lubumbashi and Goma, while civilians are hearing gunfire in Mbuji-Mayi and Kinshasa. Some members of the Diaspora are calling for violent uprising while others are pushing for peaceful resistance. Reuters is reporting that Congo-Brazzaville has readied a refugee camp in case Kinois start to flee violence in large numbers, but that doesn't seem to be happening just yet.

A few quick thoughts on what the provisional results tell us:

• Full results with precinct-by-precinct data are available here. A quick perusal shows some serious anomalies (eg, 34% of Beni-territoire voters went for Tshisekedi? Goma-ville went heavily for Kamerhe (which is expected), but Nyiragongo (directly to the north) went heavily for Kabila, which seems really odd.). There seems to be no data for Ituri or Dungu available just yet.
• We don't have precinct-level data from 2006 so it's impossible to do a statistical comparison, which would allow (albeit in limited fashion) a means of checking for fraud.
• We will, however, be able to compare these results with those released by the Tshisekedi campaign and with those of other observers. As Jason Stearns notes, however, coverage of the polls by civil society actors and party observers was limited. The Catholic Church only had representatives in 24% of polling stations and the campaigns only covered 50-60% of stations each. While there may be a full set of verified, signed counts from each polling station countrywide, it will take a lot of time to compile that data. Given the delay in the announcement of results, there's not much time to do so before the December 17 deadline for constitutional court challenges.
• The Carter Center has yet to release its fraud report. That's what I'm waiting for before doing any kind of comprehensive analysis. While it's obvious that there was fraud in the voting process, what's not yet clear is whether that fraud was systematic, planned, and only carried out by one party.
• Almost nobody in Congo wants to be ruled by somebody named Mobutu. The deceased dictator's son Mobutu Nganza garnered only 1.57% of the vote.
• Mbusa Nyamwisi garnered about 300,000 votes, mostly in his home region of far north North Kivu. This means he did significantly better than he did in 2006, when he got just under 100,000 votes.
• Turnout was 58.81% of registered voters, which could be a reflection of a couple of factors. First, many Congolese are a bit disillusioned with democracy and have not seen benefits from voting in a regime, so many may have decided to stay home - especially when a day voting means a day of lost work and lost income. Second, the chaos of the electoral process in which many could not find their names on the rolls and were not assisted in doing so by CENI plus the failure to deliver ballots on time kept many, many who wanted to vote from being able to do so.
• While the results will be difficult for many analysts to take seriously given Kabila's unpopularity in the country, it's important to remember that the vast majority of Congolese voters are still new to participatory democracy. Many may have been susceptible to subtle forms of manipulation. Openly distributing cash and gifts is standard practice in most DRC campaigns, and it's possible that many thousands of voters could have been convinced to cast their vote based on the gift of a t-shirt or $5.

It's currently just after 10pm in Kinshasa; I expect we'll see mass demonstrations in Kinshasa, Mbuji-Mayi, and/or Kananga over the weekend or early next week. What will happen with those, only time will tell.

UPDATE: Changed date for deadline for constitutional challenges to December 17 - previous typographical error said January 17.

elsewhere...

I'm now contributing occasional op-eds on DRC politics at Al Jazeera English. My first piece - on what comes next in DRC - is up there now. Many thanks to the editors at Al Jazeera for this opportunity!

today's analysis

I have a piece on the DRC elections up at The Atlantic today - click on over to read.

the start of DRC elections

This piece is cross-posted at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum's Preventing Genocide blog, where I'll be posting on threats to civilians over the next few weeks. Click on over for more thoughts from other DRC analysts.

Congolese voters go to the polls to choose legislative and presidential leaders for the second time on Monday, November 28. As several analysts have noted, the risk of election-related violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo is significant. The month-long campaign period has already resulted in serious violence, with up to ten dead in Kinshasa over the weekend and several protests being met with violent responses from the police and military. Some Congo-watchers believe violence will be short-term, sporadic, and limited to urban zones, while others fear violence could spread rapidly. Are these fears well-founded?

Congolese citizens already live under some of the worst humanitarian conditions in the world. Their country ranks dead last on this year's UNDP Human Development Index, which measures quality-of-life indicators like income, health, and education levels. One in five Congolese infants die before their fifth birthday, more than one in ten infants die in childbirth, and life expectancy for both men and women is less than fifty years. Simply being born Congolese puts a citizen at high risk of dying an untimely death from preventable causes.

These appalling statistics result from a combination of factors, including poor governance, lack of access to employment and financial resources, and the lingering effects of state collapse and of the country's wars. As such, elections are a key marker in Congo's progress towards rebuilding the state, re-establishing governance, and improving the lives of its civilians over the long-term.

The same elections that are necessary to continue D.R. Congo's transition to democracy also pose risks, however, and the potential for post-electoral violence may cause even more problems in the short, medium, and long runs. At issue is the fact that the country is deeply divided in its support for the eleven presidential candidates, including incumbent President Joesph Kabila. Kabila, who came to power after his father's assassination in 2001 and was democratically elected in 2006, is deeply unpopular, particularly in the western Congo, which includes the capital Kinshasa. There, support is divided among ten opposition candidates, the most prominent of whom are the UDPS party's Etienne Tshisekedi and Vital Kamerhe, who hails from the east. Tshisekedi, who stood up to Mobutu and, at 78 is the oldest of the candidates, sees himself as the rightful heir to Congo's presidency. He enjoys strong support in Kinshasa as well as in the Kasai provinces, which are home to the ethnic group from which Tshisekedi hails, the Luba.

Kabila won in 2006 with strong support from the eastern Congo, where voters speak his Kiswahili language and from where his family hails. This year, however, eastern Congolese voters are disillusioned with Kabila's rule. They have not seen as many benefits from Kabila's 2006 promises of increased stability and better infrastructure, and many voters there will not support him at the polls. Because Kabila knows his re-election is at risk, his supporters in Parliament changed the Constitution earlier this year to allow the president to win with a simple plurality of the vote rather than a majority, which means that no candidate has to attain fifty percent plus one of the vote. Rather, whoever gets the most votes will win.

Why might this result in violence? First, few in Kinshasa believe that Kabila can win fairly. Those voters are probably wrong; Kabila is likely to legitimately win 30-35% of the vote nationwide, but almost all of his support will come from outside of Kinshasa. Reality often matters less than perception, however, and the perception in Kinshasa will be that if Kabila wins the election, he must have stolen it. Given that outcome, Kinois voters are likely to take to the streets demanding that Kabila step down, and they will likely be met with a violent response from Kabila's presidential guard.

More potential for violence exists in the reaction of authorities and civilians to perceptions of irregularities and fraud in the voting process. Already, reports are coming in of hundreds of thousands of names being missing from voter rolls and rumors are flying that ballot papers have been pre-marked and that pens at the polling stations are filled with erasable ink. A number of polling stations had not received ballots as of Sunday night, meaning that voters in those regions will be completely disenfranchised. If Congolese civilians do not feel that their votes are cast and counted in an ethical and fair manner, some may take to the streets in protest.

The other potential for violence comes much later. As Chatham House's Ben Shepherd notes, local and provincial elections are scheduled in 2012 and 2013, and these may provoke significantly more violence in more places as voters express their frustrations about the country's lack of progress.

Is violence inevitable in the Congo this week or in the weeks to come? Not necessarily. The country enjoys a distinct advantage over 2006 in that none of the major presidential candidates still maintain private armies, as was the case with Jean-Pierre Bemba's MLC militia last time around. But politics in the country are still not settled on the basis of the rule of law, corruption is still rampant, and few feel that the electoral process reflects their wishes for the country's future. These factors do not bode well for a peaceful electoral process.

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This blog post is part of a series done in conjunction with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum looking at the risks to civilians in the period surrounding Congo's national elections. The views expressed are my own. For more information, please visit: http://www.ushmm.org/museum/exhibit/focus/congo/

DRC elections: what to watch

Against all odds and amid pre-election violence that has killed several Kinois in the last two days and widespread reports that not all polling stations have ballots and other election materials, CENI (the Congolese electoral commission) has decided to go ahead with Monday's scheduled elections. Speaking in Kinshasa on Sunday evening, CENI head Daniel Ngoy Malunda (who also serves as President Joseph Kabila's personal pastor) said that his agency is 99% ready and that the elections will happen as scheduled. Never mind that the remaining 1% could mean that 600 or so polling stations lack the materials necessary to carry out an election.

No one knows what is going to happen in this election; there were no scientific polls conducted and the exceptionally loud voices of much of the Congolese Diaspora (most of which is very pro-Tshisekedi) are making public opinion seem more skewed to the UDPS than it probably actually is. Jason Stearns (who is observing the election in Bukavu) has a helpful province-by-province breakdown of likely voting patterns, but as he notes, results will depend heavily on turnout and are too close to call at this point. A few things to watch for as results come in:

• Violence - As many as 10 are dead in Kinshasa, which is heavily opposed to Kabila and has a significant pro-Tshisekedi voting bloc. If violence happens Monday or in the days after the election, it will likely start in Kinshasa.
• Tshisekedi's reaction - Tshisekedi was blocked from entering Kinshasa for several hours Saturday and was not allowed to hold a final campaign rally Sunday (the governor of Kinshasa banned all political rallies amid rising violence on Saturday). Tshisekedi has continued with strong rhetoric, and there's no telling what he might call for if there are significant irregularities or the perception thereof on Monday. Tshisekedi is almost openly daring the government to arrest him (he has, among other comments, called on his supporters to "terrorize" the government and declared himself president in recent weeks). Tshisekedi believes he has the victory and that the public is on his side; if he doesn't get a victory in this election, he and his supporters are unlikely to accept the results as legitimate.
• The East - Kiswahili-speaking easterners were Kabila's main base of support in 2006, where he made extensive promises about improving the security situation and rebuilding infrastructure. While there is no question that both of these areas have improved somewhat in the last five years, Kabila can no longer count on voters there to have his back. DRC voters, especially in urban areas, are savvier this time around, and few are willing to take promises at face value anymore. As one Goma voter told Melanie Gouby, “We had no idea how to decide who to vote for during the 2006 elections. ...This time we know better. I won’t vote for someone because I was given a t-shirt, I want someone who will build the road, not just talk about it.” Such comments do not bode well for Kabila, whose campaign depends largely on promises of patronage.
• Irregularities - Already, there are reports that several hundred thousand registered voters names do not appear on the rolls in Ituri and Idjwi. There are almost certainly also polling stations that have not yet received ballots. How CENI reacts when these reports arise - and whether voters feel their voices were heard - will be key determinants of whether protests happen and whether such protests turn violent.

today's post

I have a post up at the Peace Dividend Trust blog today. It's an interview with a Congolese leader who helps young adults start small businesses. Click on over and check it out.

catching up

So. Things have been busy, both in Africa and here at TiA HQ. First there was the Great Lakes Policy Forum on advocacy and the DRC, then President Obama up and sent American forces to Uganda to fight the LRA, the SEC had a round table on conflict minerals, and, just to keep things interesting, Kenya invaded Somalia. A few brief thoughts on each:

• Conflict Minerals: The GLPF was very interesting, and, like the SEC round table, revealed that there are wide gulfs in ideas from advocates, Congolese citizens, the Congolese Diaspora, and industry as to what needs to happen moving forward with the implementation of Dodd-Frank section 1502. I particularly appreciated Search for Common Ground's efforts to bring together these diverse perspectives in closed sessions on the afternoons of the GLPF conference. However, there is a huge amount of disagreement on things like a timeline for implementation, what to do about the huge number of now-unemployed miners (which Congolese civil society leaders familiar with the artisanal mining sector estimate to be in the 1-2 million range), and what the rules should be for issues as varied as recycled materials, gold, and companies that have tens of thousands of suppliers.
• The LRA. I'm with Wronging Rights on this one; it passes the Love Actually Test and isn't likely to do harm. Contrary to what many Ugandans and others in the region think, the commitment of 100 Special Forces troops in an advisory capacity to track down a really bad guy is not a front for getting Uganda's oil. (Those contracts are almost certainly already for sale to the highest bidder.) Despite divisions within the LRA ranks, this is one of the few instances in which taking out the leader of a movement will largely destroy the organization. It poses a minimal risk to US forces and has the potential to do a lot of good. That said, I think it will still be very difficult to get Joseph Kony, and we shouldn't fool ourselves into thinking that elite American troops will ultimately be able to get him. Kony has a number of tactical advantages and he knows the terrain incredibly well. Satellite surveillance, drones, and the like won't work as he often tends to hang out in areas with triple-canopy tree coverage. It won't be easy, but I don't think this will hurt.
  
• Kenya/Somalia. It was bound to happen sooner or later, what with the increasingly intolerable massive security threat just over the border. But Kenya's decision to invade in support of Somalia's TFG was somewhat surprising, to put it mildly. But it makes sense; somebody had to take decisive action in Somalia, and with the boots-on-the-ground support they're getting from Ethiopia and the US/French air support (nobody really knows), it might succeed in wiping out a good bit of al Shabaab. That won't lead to a functioning state in Somalia, but it might open the door to thinking about alternative forms of governance for the territory. Plus, a war might have seemed like a useful way to distract Kenyan voters from the government and opposition's ICC problem. However, if terrorist attacks keep happening in Nairobi, there's no telling how Kenyans will react at the ballot box next year. For now, most are scared and hoping for peace.